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THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The law regarding summary judgment is clear. If there are genuine issues of 
material fact, summary judgment may not be granted. Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. Pro. When 
faced with a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all facts including all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease, 
Inc., 2008 UT App 146, % 7, 184 P.3d 610. Further, Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah R. Civ. Pro 
states, "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may 
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute." The rules specifically 
contemplate the potential to create a genuine issue of material fact through the provision 
of a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. In the instant action, Brighton Title 
did not dispute the facts alleged by Cooper. It did however present a separate statement 
of additional facts in dispute which created a genuine issue of material fact which 
precluded the grant of summary judgment. 
Brighton Title submitted the Hansen Contract which revealed Cooper was not in 
title to the property. (R. 488-501). This created a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning whether Cooper had any interest in the property and moreover an interest 
which gave rise to the right to sell the property to Deseret Sky. 
Brighton Title submitted the affidavit of Richard Peter Stevens, former Assistant 
Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department who explained the nature of Insurance 
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Department Bulletins and the sanctions or enforcement which can spring from the 
violations of said bulletins. (R. 560-563). Mr. Stevens averred it was industry standard 
and practice to comply with the bulletins. In addition, Brighton Title presented the 
affidavit of Jeff Gorringe who stated on June 1, 2008, he informed Metro National Title 
Deseret Sky would not close on the transaction because Cooper was not in title. (R. 566-
569). This constituted an objection before the June 8, 2007 deadline. Gorringe informed 
Metro National Title unless Cooper provided a full assignment of the Hansen contract or 
provided assurances Cooper would close the transaction with its own funds, Brighton 
Title would not participate in this illegal flip transaction. (R. 566-567). 
Brighton Title presented the affidavit of Matt Sager the underwriting counsel for 
Stewart Guaranty Company (R. 570-574). He specifically reviewed the transaction and 
found it to be an illegal flip transaction. (R. 572). Brighton Title's underwriter refused to 
insure the transaction. 
Cooper asserted a contractual claim in the Property which it believed provided the 
legal basis to sell the Property. (R. 532-541). It did not provide any evidence to the 
Court of a present ability to obtain title prior to the closing of the Deseret Sky sale. Thus, 
there was a question of fact concerning whether Cooper had any practical ability to obtain 
title during the executory period without violating Utah law. This alone precluded the 
grant of summary judgment. While Brighton did not dispute the factual allegations 
presented by Cooper, it did present additional facts which created a genuine issue of 
material fact which precluded the grant of summary judgment. 
n 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING A FORFEITURE OF THE 
EARNEST MONEY 
At its core, the trial court's summary judgment is a forfeiture of the earnest money 
which was on deposit. This forfeiture was based on Deseret Sky's alleged failure to 
timely cancel the real estate purchase contract. Pursuant to the REPC, Deseret Sky had 
until June 8, 2007 to cancel the contract. (R. 280-289). On June 1, 2007, Jeff Gorringe 
contacted Metro National Title and informed Metro National, Cooper's escrow agent, 
Deseret Sky would not close on the transaction because Cooper was not in title. (R. 556-
567). On June 11, 2007, Deseret Sky sent a letter to Robert Cooper terminating the 
REPC. (R. 200, 431). 
In Utah, it is clear the law abhors forfeiture. See e.g. Madsen v. Anderson, 667 
P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983). Yet this is precisely what the trial court ordered based on the 
failure to strictly comply with the termination provision of the contract, despite the timely 
oral notice provided to Cooper's escrow agent and the subsequent written notice to 
Cooper. This is particularly problematic where the Seller, Cooper, was never in title to 
the property. Like the wheel of fortune, Cooper who never owned the property stands to 
profit from the failed sale of property which it never owned. 
Other jurisdictions similarly abhor a forfeiture. In Armstrong, Gibbons v. 
Southridge Inv., 589 A.2d 836 (R.L 1991), the case involved the purchase of an 
apartment complex where $100,000.00 had been deposited in escrow. The Court held 
that where oral notice was timely given, but the written confirmation of that oral notice 
was untimely, it would not order a forfeiture, regardless of the contract language which 
required notices be in writing. 
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Obviously, the purpose of the notice requirement is it insures the party is 
informed. See e.g. Vole, Inc. v. Georgacopoulos, 181 111. App.3d 1012, 1019 (1989). 
There is no dispute that Cooper was informed. 
The equities simply weigh against a forfeiture in the instant action. As a matter 
of public policy, a person who never owns a parcel of real property but nonetheless sells 
it to another, should not benefit from a liquidated damages provision which results in a 
forfeiture of the earnest money when they are on actual notice from the escrow company 
that unless Cooper provided assurances they could close the transaction and get on title, 
Deseret Sky was terminating the transaction. 
in 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING 
BRIGHTON TITLE WAS NOT BOUND TO FOLLOW THE INSURANCE 
DEPARTMENT'S BULLETINS 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling Brighton Title was not bound to 
follow the Utah Department of Insurance Bulletins. Brighton Title believes the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in concluding both that Brighton Title was not obligated to 
comply with the Bulletins and its compliance therewith did not excuse its performance 
under the terms of the REPC. Further, even if the insurance bulletin does not have the 
force of law, this Court should adopt a good faith exception to liability where the title 
company's behavior comports with the insurance department's bulletins which interpret 
the law. 
Utah has adopted the good funds statute, as set forth in Section 31 A-23a-406, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Essentially, this statute requires in part that funds 
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be cleared before they can disburse. On or about January 30, 2007, D. Kent Michie, Utah 
Insurance Commissioner, issued Bulletin 2007-1, thereby interpreting the above 
referenced statute as it relates to prohibited escrow settlement closings. (R. 543). 
Bulletin 2007-1 provides the insurance department's interpretation of the good 
funds statute. The bulletin specifically informs title agencies when a transaction is illegal 
in violation of Section 31 A-23a-406. Pursuant to the express language of the bulletin, it 
states, "the Utah Insurance Commissioner and the Title and Escrow Commission have 
determined the following structure to be the only permitted method of acting as escrow 
wherein the same parcel of property is purchased and then immediately sold." (R. 543). 
Based on the good funds statute, as interpreted by the Insurance Department, only if the 
transaction follows the approved structure may a Utah licensed title insurance agency act 
as escrow for the transaction. 
The instant transaction expressly and squarely fit within the description of flip 
transactions which are not permitted and violated UCA Section 31 A-23a-406. As such, 
the contract between Cooper and Deseret Sky was illegal under the good funds statute. 
Illegal contracts or those which offend public policy are void ab initio. See e.g.Ockey v. 
Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51. In the instant case, the contract between Cooper and 
Deseret Sky was illegal and void ab initio. Therefore, the REPC was simply 
unenforceable against any party. 
The REPC clearly violated Utah Code Annotated Section 31 A-23a-406. 
Because it was an illegal transaction, the REPC was unenforceable. The insurance 
bulletin clarified the illegality of such transactions by setting forth a graphic example of 
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those transactions in which the department's licensees may or may not participate in as an 
escrow agent. Brighton Title, as a licensed escrow agent and title insurance producer, 
complied with the law by not participating in an illegal transaction. Brighton Title 
further complied with the insurance department's interpretation of the good funds statute. 
It was plain error for the trial court to hold it liable for Brighton Title's unwillingness to 
participate in an illegal transaction which clearly violated public policy within the State 
of Utah was evidenced by the legislative enactment of the good funds statute. 
Assuming arguendo this Court finds the insurance department bulletin does not 
have the force of law(i), this Court should adopt a good faith exception to liability based 
on compliance with the Insurance Department's interpretation of Utah's good funds 
statute. Regardless of whether the insurance department bulletins have the force of law, 
they directly govern the manner in which the industry conducts its business. Title 
insurance producers are expected to and do conform their behavior to the bulletins in 
order to keep their conduct in align with the expectations of the insurance department.^) 
As such, this Court should as a matter of public policy adopt a good faith exception to 
liability where the title insurance producer complies with the department interpretations 
of the law. 
Utah provides a number of exceptions to liability based on good faith. Good faith 
exceptions from liability exist for example in the following circumstances: (a) reporting 
child abuse (UCA §62A-4a-410(l)); (b) participation in peer review committees (42 USC 
1 This is Cooper's red herring because it is the violation of the good funds statute which renders the transaction 
illegal, the contract void ab initio, unenforceable, and prevented Brighton Title from participating in the transaction. 
2 Title insurance producers are not an isolated group when it comes to this paradigm. For example, attorneys, 
physicians, engineers, architects and many other professions are governed by similar rules of conduct. 
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§11112(a) and SLW/Utah, Brinton v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956 (Utah 1998)); and 
(c) good Samaritan medical intervention (UCA §41-6-31). In each circumstance, the public 
policy and benefit furthered by good faith compliance outweighs the individualized 
potential for damage thereby resulting in the exemption from liability. 
There is substantial precedent for good faith exceptions in other contexts. By 
way of example, in Missouri, one who procures an injunction in good faith is exempt 
from liability flowing from that injunction. See e.g. State ex rel. Shannon County v. 
Chilton, 626 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Mo.App. 1981). In California, a trustee is exempt from 
liability for his good faith reliance on information provided to him by the beneficiary. 
See e.g. Kachlon v. Markowitz, 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (2008). There 
is a good faith exemption from liability for organ donation removal without genuine 
consent. See e.g. Ramirez v. Health Partners of Southern Arizona, 193 Ariz. 325, 972 
P.2d 658 (App. 1998). In each circumstance, the public policy and benefit furthered by 
good faith compliance outweighs the individualized potential for damage thereby 
resulting in the exemption from liability. 
A good faith exception to liability for reliance on the department's statutory 
interpretation is consistent with the reality of governmental administrative operations. As 
stated in Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467 (1944): 
The nature of the administrative process in executing a statutory scheme requires 
that administrative agencies not only determine the administrative questions 
involved, but apply the law in the first instance as well — that is, that they also 
venture an initial decision on the judicial questions. Otherwise, as a practical 
matter, the agencies could not function. 
12 
Id. at 31. The Court went on to acknowledge that when an administrative agency 
interprets a statute, that interpretation is not binding upon the Court. However, the Utah 
Hotel court favorably quoted a law review article which stated, 
Some if not the majority of the regulations issued under most regulatory acts are 
interpretive. Such regulations express the views of the administrative officer or 
agency as to the meaning or application of general requirements of a regulatory 
act, the construction that will be followed in administering the act. Interpretive 
regulations (except where they have been 'ratified1 by Congress) have validity in 
judicial proceedings only to the extent that they correctly construe the statute and 
then, strictly speaking, it is the statute and not the regulation to which the 
individual must conform. 
Id. at 36 quoting Lee in 29 Geo. L.J. 1. In the instant action, the insurance department 
bulletins do exactly that, express the view of the agency as to the meaning and 
application of Utah's good funds statute, interpreting and insuring title insurers conform 
their conduct to the statute, and the bulletin's interpretation of the statute. 
When an insurance licensee conforms its conduct to the agency's interpretation of statute, 
it should not be subject to liability for such conduct. 
In the instant case, Cooper entered into a contract to purchase the Property from 
Hansen. (R. 488-502). Thereafter, without closing on title, Cooper entered into a Real 
Estate Purchase Contract to sell the property to Deseret Sky. (R. 2, 198, 231, 280-289). 
However, Cooper at all times intended to use part of the sale proceeds received from 
Deseret Sky to complete the purchase of the property from Hansen. (R. 551-52). As 
such, the transaction was expressly a flip which the Department of Insurance stated was 
prohibited by Section 31A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) as 
interpreted by the Department in Bulletin 2007-1. Despite Brighton Title's recognition of 
the illegal nature of the transaction and its compliance with the administrative agency's 
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interpretation of the good funds statute, nonetheless the trial court found it liable for its 
unwillingness to participate in a transaction which has been declared illegal by statute 
and illegal by the department's interpretation of that statute. Such liability flies in the 
face of the very public policy which rendered such transactions illegal. 
Compliance with a Utah Department of Insurance Bulletin should not provide a 
basis for a monetary judgment. As stated by the Court in Underwood v. State, 439 So.2d 
125 (Ala. 1983) in discussing the effect of an advisory opinion, "Such an opinion has the 
effect of protecting such person to whom it is directed from liability . . . because of any 
official action or actions performed as directed or advised in such opinion.11 Id. at 128. 
In the instant circumstance, Brighton Title was prudent and followed the admonition of 
the agency charged with providing interpretations of the law to members of the industry. 
By so doing, it should be protected from liability for that compliance. The trial court 
erred by finding otherwise. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING IN THE CONTEXT OF A 
SPLIT CLOSING A TITLE COMPANY OWES A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO BOTH 
PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION ESPECIALLY WHEN THE 
TRANSACTION IS ILLEGAL 
In rendering its summary judgment ruling, the trial court concluded that Brighton 
Title breached as fiduciary duty owed to Cooper. While generally, a title company acting 
as escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to the transaction, in the case of a 
split closing involving a separately retained title agent, the general rule should not apply. 
In the instant action, Cooper elected the transaction close as a "split closing" which 
means the buyer engages its own title company and the seller engages a different title 
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company. The trial court held in this context, each title company owes a fiduciary duty to 
both parties to the transaction. 
Generally, the rule is an escrow agent owes a duty to both parties to the 
transaction. Freegard v. First W. Nat'I Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987); Hertz v. 
Nordic Ltd., Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1988). The scope of that duty is defined 
by the escrow instructions. See e.g. Markowitz v. Fidelity Nat, 142 Cal.App.4th 508, 527, 
48 Cal. Rptr.3d 217 (2006). However, the escrow agent does not owe a duty to third 
partieswith whom it has no contract. See e.g. Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. 
Continental Lawyers Title Co., 41 P.3d 548, 449, 552 (Cal. 2002). 
In the instant illegal flip transaction, there were two separate transactions. As 
interpreted by Bulletin 2007-5, a split escrow occurs when two parties to a real property 
transaction conduct their own portion of the escrow using two separate title producers. 
(R. 683-684). By so doing, it creates two separate transactions, each of which must 
comply with all of the requirements of an escrow as set forth in UCA §31A-23a-406. 
This section requires the entity conducting an escrow must be a title producer, which is 
properly licensed, be appointed by an authorized title insurer [underwriter] and it must 
issue one or more title insurance policies. 
In the instant case, there were two separate transactions. Brighton Title handled 
a transaction for Deseret Sky to whom it owed a duty. In order to complete the 
transaction, pursuant to UCA §31A-23a-406, Brighton Title had to issue a title insurance 
policy. Because Cooper was not in title, there was no way Brighton Title could issue a 
title insurance policy. Therefore, as a matter of law Brighton Title could not act as the 
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escrow agent. Most significantly, because there were two separate transactions, Brighton 
Title did not owe any duty to Cooper. 
The statutes at issue, as well as their interpretative bulletins are prophylactic. 
They are designed to prevent illegal conduct, as well as provide a sanction for engaging 
in such conduct. The bulletins interpreting the statutes make clear title companies are to 
be aware of and look for transactions which violate the law and to not participate therein. 
This is sound public policy which is consistent with the language of the statutes. To hold 
a title company liable for refusing to participate in an illegal transaction violates the clear 
public policy of this state. 
V 
BRIGHTON TITLE WAS NOT CONTRACTUALLY BOUND BY A CONTRACT 
TO WHICH IT WAS NOT A PARTY 
The trial court found Brighton Title liable based on its breach of contract to 
Cooper. Brighton Title was not a party to the contract between Cooper and Deseret Sky. 
Cooper and Deseret Sky entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement. (R. 532-541). 
At no time did Brighton Title sign the Real Estate Purchase Agreement nor any of the 
Addendums thereto. 
Brighton Title was not a party to the contract. It is only by the terms of the 
contract Cooper could elect liquidated damages in the amount of the earnest money. 
Because Cooper made that election under the terms of the contract, its relief pursuant to 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO COOPER WHEN 
IT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY ITS AFFIRMATIVE 
MISREPRESENTATION THAT IT HELD FEE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY 
Cooper breached the REPC at the point of its execution and was the party first in 
breach. The trial court erred in granting judgment to Cooper when it did not and never 
has held fee title to the property, but nonetheless affirmatively represented it held fee 
title. Because Cooper never held title to the property and was the party first in breach, 
the Court erred in granting Cooper judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah law is clear. "The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to 
a contract excuses further performance by the non-breaching party." Holbrook v. Master 
Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994). What constitutes a material 
breach is a question of fact. Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug 
Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App. 1994). However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
added clarity in defining a material breach, stating, "a failure of performance which 
defeats the very object of the contract or [is] of such prime importance that the contract 
would not have been made if default in that particular had been contemplated is a 
material failure." Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). In the 
instant case, the very object of the contract was the sale of real property. At no time did 
Cooper own the real property. This lack of ownership was a material breach, which 
excused any performance by Deseret Sky, and therefore any duty by Brighton Title. 
17 
VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT COOPER DID NOT 
HAVE TO BE IN TITLE DURING THE EXECUTORY PERIOD WHEN 
COOPER HAD NO ABILITY TO GET IN TITLE ABSENT THE FUNDS FROM 
THE DESERET SKY CLOSING. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding Cooper did not have to be in 
title during the executory period, when Cooper had no independent ability to get in title 
absent the funds from the Deseret Sky closing. Because Cooper could not use Deseret 
Sky's funds to close its transaction with Hansen without violating Utah law (see UCA 
§31 A-23a-406), there was no evidence before the Court that Cooper could have gotten 
title at during the executory period. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Cooper argued it was not required under 
Utah law to be in title during the entire executory period, based on the law as set forth in 
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1981). However, the rule in Neves was qualified. 
For instance, in Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666 (1909), the Court ruled the 
governing principle was "whether the title was beyond the control of the vendor so that 
his acts amounted to a repudiation of his contract." Id. at 669-70. The Neves Court 
stated 
A defect which, by its nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter 
is one 'of such a nature that the vendor neither has title "nor in a practical sense 
any prospect of acquiring it.' 
Neves at 1200 citing to Davis v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 255 Or. 233, 465 P.2d 702 (1970) 
and Gillmore v. Green, 39 Wn.2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951). The ruling in Neves cannot 
be read in isolation without considering the interplay of the now enacted provisions of the 
Utah Code. 
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Cooper's argument is because it intended to use the funds received from the sale to 
Deseret Sky to secure title, the holding in Neves controls. This argument is in error 
because pursuant to UCA §31A-23a-406 it is now illegal to use the funds from a 
subsequent sale to acquire title. Either you have independent funds to secure title or you 
do not. In this case, Cooper admitted it did not. As such, Cooper neither had title nor did 
it present any evidence that in a practical sense it had any prospect of acquiring title. 
The evidence before the trial court was clear. It is undisputed on the date the 
parties entered into the REPC, Cooper did not have fee title. (R.199-200; 511; 532-541). 
It is further undisputed Cooper's purchase of the property from Hansen required Cooper 
use part of the money paid by Deseret Sky to complete its acquisition of title. (R. 551-
552). 
A close scrutiny of the undisputed facts, leads to a single conclusion. Specifically, 
Cooper could not as a practical matter remove the defect, i.e. its lack of fee title, before 
Deseret Sky performed by paying the money. As such, its inability to convey title 
justified Deseret Sky's lack of performance. If Cooper did not have fee title, Brighton 
Title, who was responsible in part for insuring the transaction and the title, could not 
insure the property. Because Brighton could not insure the property, it could not act as 
escrow agent. Regardless of what the contract may have stated the law states otherwise. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment to Cooper who 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING BRIGHTON TITLE 
BREACHED ITS DUTY TO COOPER WHERE THE TRANSACTION WAS AN 
ILLEGAL FLIP 
The instant transaction was an illegal flip. Because the transaction was illegal, the 
trial court erred in concluding Brighton Title breached its duty to Cooper. Because the 
transaction was precluded as a matter of law, Brighton Title did not breach its duty to 
Cooper by refusing to participate in the transaction. Brighton Title had no choice but to 
withdraw from the transaction and refund the money on deposit to its depositor, Deseret 
Sky. 
A flip transaction is one in which the owner of a parcel of real property ("Seller 
A") intends to sell it to a buyer ("Buyer A") who intends to immediately resell the 
property to a subsequent buyer ("Buyer B"). A flip transaction may either be legal or 
illegal. A legal flip transaction occurs where Buyer A brings to the table its own 
independent funds and completes the purchase from Seller A in its entirety separately 
from the subsequent sale to Buyer B. §31 A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated; R590-153-
5; and Bulletin 2007-1. A flip transaction structured in this fashion is entirely legal. 
An illegal flip transaction arises when Buyer A relies on the funds from Buyer B 
to purchase the property from Seller A. §31A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated; R590-
153-5; and Bulletin 2007-1. The instant transaction was an illegal flip because Cooper 
was relying on the funds provided from Deseret Sky to complete the purchase of the 
property from Hansen. (R. 551-552). 
Because the transaction was an illegal flip, Brighton Title was specifically 
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precluded from participating by both the statutes of the State of Utah as well as the 
Department of Insurance interpretations of those statutes as set forth in its bulletin. The 
trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment. 
IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING A 
TITLE COMPANY MAY ACT AS AN ESCROW AGENT IN A TRANSACTION 
IT CANNOT INSURE 
Brighton Title acted as both an insurer and escrow agent in this transaction. The 
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that in such circumstances, Brighton 
Title could act as the escrow agent in a transaction it could not insure. Pursuant to 
Section 31A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), if a title agent cannot 
issue a title insurance policy, they are prohibited by law from conducting the escrow. 
Brighton Title's underwriter refused to insure the transaction because it was an illegal flip 
which violated Utah law. (R. 571-573). Because Brighton Title could not insure the 
transaction, it was not able to act as escrow agent on the transaction. 
X 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROVIDE ANY ANALYSIS OR 
REASONING IN GRANTING COOPER SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN 
SIGNING THE RULING PREPARED BY COOPER 
The trial court granted summary judgment without providing any form of grounds 
for having done so. (R. 707-708). Thereafter, but only after a plethora of motions by 
Brighton Title, did the trial court provide any insight into the decision it rendered. This 
Court should take the opportunity to clarify the duty of the trial court in rendering 
decisions on summary judgment. After the clarification, the trial court executed Cooper's 
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proposed Summary Judgment which was a nearly verbatim reiteration of Cooper's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment substantially 
exceeded in scope and breadth the court's clarified ruling. If the Court intended to adopt 
all of the facts, arguments and grounds contained in Cooper's motion, it should have 
expressly done so. Otherwise, the summary judgment should have conformed to the 
Court's clarifying order, not Cooper's motion for summary judgment. This Court should 
instruct the bench on the scope of its duties when rendering such future summary 
judgment decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court. The Court erred in granting summary 
judgment because there were both genuine issues of material fact and Cooper was not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As such, this Court should reverse the trial court. 
Stowell Law PLLC 
Attorneys for Appellant, Brighton Title 
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